Dialogue can help China, India sidestep disputes over mega dam

To alleviate concerns and reduce tensions, greater transparency, consistent data sharing and diplomacy are essential

Genevieve Donnellon-May

On Christmas Day, China formally approved a controversial 60-gigawatt “super dam” project in the Tibet autonomous region, on the Yarlung Tsangpo River, the upper section of the transboundary Brahmaputra.

The ambitious hydropower project, first announced in November 2020, is expected to surpass 1 trillion yuan (US$137 billion) in investment. Included in China’s 14th five-year plan (2021-2025), the dam is part of plans for China to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 and could generate three times more energy than the Three Gorges Dam.

Although the start date and exact location remain unclear, media reports from late 2020 suggested the dam could be built near the “Great Bend” close to the China-India border. This has sparked considerable alarm in downstream India. While the Chinese foreign ministry has pledged to maintain dialogue with downstream nations and step up cooperation on disaster prevention, amid Sino-Indian tensions, New Delhi remains wary about the mega dam’s impact on the Brahmaputra’s flow.

The Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra is one of the world’s largest transnational rivers and vital to the livelihoods of millions across China, India, Bangladesh and Bhutan. Originating in southwest China’s Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, it flows through southern Tibet, crossing the Himalayas into India (where it is called the Brahmaputra), before entering Bangladesh.

The official go-ahead for the mega dam adds to India’s concerns over China’s large-scale engineering projects on shared rivers like the Brahmaputra, and underscores the complexities of Sino-Indian river governance.

The Brahmaputra is central to the socioeconomic development of both countries. For India, the river contributes nearly 30 per cent of the country’s freshwater resources and 40 per cent of its hydropower potential. The river plays a smaller role in China’s freshwater supply but is vital to Tibet’s agricultural and energy sectors.

The absence of a formal water-sharing agreement between China and India for the Brahmaputra exacerbates the challenges of shared river governance. Bilateral cooperation remains fragmented, limited primarily to hydrological data-sharing and other issues like emergency management.

Competing water and development plans heighten tensions between China and India, due in part to China’s hydropower projects on the Brahmaputra’s upper reaches. While Beijing insists they are intended solely for hydropower generation, New Delhi remains sceptical.

As early as in 2020, India was openly considering building a 10GW hydroelectric dam in Arunachal Pradesh to counter any potential disruptions to water flows from China’s “super dam”. More recently, last July, India revealed a US$15.3 billion initiative to revive 12 hydropower projects along the Sino-Indian border.

Compounding the issue are historical territorial and border disputes. Without a mutually agreed border, China and India assert competing claims to territory – such as Arunachal Pradesh/South Tibet – in the eastern Himalayas.

These claims are tied to their sovereignty assertions. For China, relinquishing its claim to South Tibet/Arunachal Pradesh would undermine its sovereignty over Tibet. India, meanwhile, is unwilling to cede the territory, as it holds symbolic significance following China’s victory in the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Both countries accuse the other of hydro-hegemonic behaviour. As the upper riparian state, China can make decisions that directly affect the water flow downstream, raising fears in India. These concerns are intensified by China’s lack of an independent transboundary river policy. Beijing instead manages these issues through bilateral relations with downstream nations.

China’s reluctance to engage in multilateral frameworks has resulted in Beijing not signing an international transboundary water treaty. While criticised for this approach, many of China’s neighbours, including India, have not signed one either. Still, China appears to adhere to the principles of the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, despite not being a signatory.

China contributes an estimated 7-30 per cent of the Brahmaputra’s basin discharge. While efforts to alter the river’s flow are unlikely to significantly affect India’s water supply, the potential for disruption remains a source of alarm.

Meanwhile, questions surround India’s adherence to the UN convention and its water-sharing treaties with neighbours such as Nepal have faced criticism for disproportionately benefiting India.

Others argue that New Delhi encourages the narrative of “Chinese hegemony” to deflect attention from its own hydropower development projects on shared rivers. For example, India’s Pakal Dul hydropower facility on a tributary of the Chenab River, which crosses into Pakistan, has been accused of reducing Pakistan’s ability to develop similar projects.

To alleviate these concerns and reduce tensions, greater transparency and consistent data-sharing are essential. First, China should release hydrological data and detailed plans for its new hydropower dam project. Without this information, India is left in the dark about the dam’s impact, fuelling mistrust.

India should also address its concerns by formally requesting specific details so as to mitigate any adverse effects and better understand China’s water management goals. This would allow Beijing to directly address India’s concerns, rather than simply denying any ill intent.

Second, China could build on bilateral agreements by providing real-time, year-round hydrological data. Past incidents, such as China not sharing data during the 72-day Doklam stand-off in 2017, despite an agreement in place, underscore the importance of consistency.

Transparency and consistent data sharing would show goodwill, support India’s planning and management of shared river resources, and help alleviate any suspicion of Chinese manipulation of water flows.

Third, diplomacy should be encouraged to foster trust and cooperation between India and China. This could involve research and dialogues between scientists and researchers, as well as Track 1.5 dialogues and high-level discussions to build understanding and reduce tensions.

As the upper riparian state, China has a key responsibility in managing the shared water resources responsibly. But India, as the downstream country, also has a duty to engage constructively in the process.

Published by the South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3292784/dialogue-can-help-china-india-sidestep-disputes-over-mega-dam